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Abstract: The article investigates the effects of crisis-related collective bargaining on 
different contractual groups of workers. Comparing four workplaces of two multinationals 
in Germany and Belgium in the recent economic crisis, we observe that Belgian unions could 
protect some temporary workers’ jobs and when the crisis endured, the permanent 
workforces’ jobs and working conditions. In contrast, temporary jobs in the German 
workplaces were not protected and later on, the works councils had to concede on the 
permanent workers’ working conditions to safeguard their jobs. This is explained by the 
intersection of institutional and firm-level differences which interacted to offer (or not) 
resources to unions to enforce protection.  
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Introduction 
The global economic and financial crisis that hit Europe between 2008 and 2012 is 
considered to be the worst since the Great Depression in 1929 (Eurofound, 2014; Reuters, 
2009). We argue that collective bargaining played a major role in workplace-level adaptation 
to the fall in orders experienced by the two case-study companies, in some instances 
cushioning the potential employment effects for some employee groups but in others 
exposing non-core staff to greater employment risk. Critical in this was the context set by 
the legal framework and the impact of higher-level collective agreements. During the 2008-
2012 crisis, collective agreements at different levels were used to find ways to allow 
employers to continue their operations and employees to keep their jobs. However, 
according to Glassner and Keune (2010), company-level collective agreements often 
contained concessions on pay and working conditions. This article investigates the short-
term effects of crisis-related collective bargaining on contractual groups in four workplaces 
in Germany and Belgium. This is relevant in the light of debates on labour market 
segmentation and fragmentation (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Grimshaw and Rubery, 1998), 
because also in times of crisis, employers and employee representatives might employ 
different strategies related to different contractual groups of workers. The term “crisis-
related collective bargaining” refers to negotiations which took place in economically 
difficult situations, leading to pressure on both sides of the bargaining table. The term also 
expresses the diversity in reached agreements, since they are not necessarily built upon 
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concession bargaining, although this concept has often been linked to bargaining in times 
of crisis (Cappelli, 1985). 
Although the content and the processes leading to concessions in local negotiations 
in times of crisis have been widely investigated, there is a lack of systematic and comparative 
analysis of the social effects produced for different contractual groups of workers. However, 
it is crucial to understand the causes and the social processes involved in such concessions. 
This implies studying the effects (rather than the causes alone) of crisis-related collective 
bargaining on different contractual groups of workers and compare them within and across 
companies and countries. By drawing from a 2-by-2 comparison of four case studies of two 
multinational companies’ subsidiaries in Germany and Belgium, we assess the short-term 
impact of crisis-related collective bargaining for different contractual groups of workers. To 
do so, we examine the amount of time between when crisis strikes until the plant recovers 
following the bargaining processes and their outcomes in this period. We do not attempt to 
generalize our findings but rather draw a holistic picture of the effects of crisis-related 
collective bargaining on different groups of workers in the investigated workplaces. 
The article is structured as follows. Firstly, the role of collective bargaining in times 
of crisis is examined. Secondly, we address the relevant crisis-related measures adopted in 
Germany and Belgium at different levels because they defined the framework under which 
workplace-level agreements were negotiated. Then, selected features about the German and 
Belgium bargaining system and workplace-level industrial relations are highlighted. Having 
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explained research design and methodology, we present the empirical findings and engage 
in further analysis and discussion before concluding the article.  
 
The role of collective bargaining in the recent crisis 
Collective bargaining in times of crisis has often been linked to ‘concession bargaining’, 
especially in the case of company-level responses to the US recession in the early 1980s. In 
this context, concession bargaining described the company strategy to cope with structural 
changes in the economy. It both reflected and led to intensified international competition, 
to a growing pace of technical progress and cost pressures (McKersie and Cappelli, 1982). 
Management has thus changed human resource management policies and practices to 
strengthen the companies’ competitiveness (Kochan et al., 1986). In exchange for 
concessions, US-unions could push for more security in several cases, for example through 
no-layoff policies or earning protection programmes (Cappelli, 1985). As a result, concession 
bargaining referred to exchanging labour cost moderation for improvements in job security 
in difficult times. In other words, while workers gave in on wages, firms conceded on 
guaranteeing employment. Likewise, the 2008-2012 crisis has not left the collective 
bargaining landscape untouched, since workplace-level actors bargained on wage reductions 
or freezes, cutting back benefits, two-tier wage systems, and on seeking to increase flexibility 
overall (Carley and Marginson, 2011). In the initial crisis years (2008-2010), private sector 
employers and employees often tried to mitigate the crisis effects jointly in a way that 
increased security for both parties. Short-time work was for this reason popular, since it 
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helped to prevent job and skill losses simultaneously (Glassner and Keune, 2012). However, 
when it became clear that the crisis would be long term (2010-2012), employers were able 
to impose higher flexibility more easily, and only in select cases, were unions able to 
negotiate employment guarantees in exchange (Marginson et al., 2014; Eurofound, 2012, 
2014).  
Drawing from literature on concession bargaining, there are important implications 
for the regulation of company-level employment relations. Firstly, by directly linking labour 
costs to job security, concession bargaining puts pressure on workers. It may contribute to 
undermining wages and working conditions at the workplace-level by enabling deviations 
from higher level agreements through bargaining decentralisation. Glassner and Keune 
(2012) as well as Marginson (2014) consider the accelerated bargaining decentralisation as 
one of the main outcomes of the 2008-2012 crisis in Europe. Secondly, concession 
bargaining links company-level bargaining to the firm’s economic condition. For this reason, 
situations leading to concession bargaining challenge employers and employees alike 
(McKersie and Cappelli, 1982). Management needs to decide if and under which conditions 
operations can be continued. If so, then labour cost savings could be considered as a way to 
increase competitiveness. On the other hand, unions face the dilemma to choose between 
securing employment or maintaining wages and working conditions under the risk of plant 
closure.  
As shown, there has been a lot of research about collective (concession) bargaining 
in times of crisis, but the effects on different (contractual) groups of workers have hardly 
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been investigated. This is surprising as current research on labour market segmentation and 
dualisation (for example Rubery et al., 2009; Holst, 2014) emphasizes the relevance of 
management and labour strategies on workplace-level inequalities (Crouch and Keune, 
2012). Ever since the 1970s on, research on labour market segmentation has highlighted the 
unequal treatment of different groups of workers (Doeringer and Piore, 1971; Berger and 
Piore, 1980; Atkinson, 1984). In recent years, following Grimshaw et al. (2001:29), 
‘deregulation has allowed managers, even within a single organization, to consider and adopt 
different employment policies and practices as solutions for different groups of workers’. 
Related research on fragmentation (Grimshaw et al., 2001; Holst, 2014) therefore 
emphasizes a more nuanced view, stating that the formerly stable borders between the 
protected core employees and unprotected periphery have blurred. In other words, labour 
markets have changed from a system of formerly strong internal labour markets protecting 
core employees towards a more fragmented landscape with employment regulatory 
institutions becoming weaker and organizations utilizing a wide range of contractual 
arrangements (Grimshaw and Rubery, 1998). The presence of fragmented labour markets 
makes us expect that workplace-level actors engaging in bargaining in times of crisis may 
adopt different strategies towards different contractual groups of workers. Because of this, 
crisis-related collective bargaining arrangements may produce different effects on the jobs 
and working conditions of permanent and temporary workers because employers may use a 
variety of work arrangements to increase efficiency and flexibility whereas unions may be 
more interested in safeguarding jobs. But what are the short-term effects of such crisis-
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related agreements on the different contractual groups of workers? And to what extent do 
firm-level characteristics and institutional settings influence those effects? 
 
Anti-crisis-measures adopted in Germany and Belgium 
Germany and Belgium were hit hard by the economic crisis, which globally developed in 
three stages. Its first stage was marked by the subprime mortgage crisis in the US-financial 
sector in 2007. It spread and reached the European financial sector in autumn 2008, with 
the crisis of Hypo Real Estate in Germany and Fortis Holding in Belgium. In its second stage, 
the crisis spilled over to the real economy, and led to plunging production volumes and 
export rates, a decline in consumption, rising unemployment and, subsequently, 
contractions in GDP (real GDP growth rates: -5.1% for Germany, and -2.8% for Belgium 
in 2009 compared to the year before according to Eurostat, 2015). In its third stage, the 
crisis reached the public sector. As a reaction to this, policymakers in both countries 
augmented public expenditures to counteract, thereby putting pressure on public budgets. 
Collective bargaining played a central role in Germany and Belgium as a mechanism 
through which the state, trade unions and employers attempted to mitigate the crisis effects 
at different levels. Higher-level collective agreements provided the context for additional 
company-level negotiations. In Belgium, a two-year multi-sector agreement was reached in 
December 2008 which aimed at simultaneously balancing firms’ competitiveness, high levels 
of employment and workers’ purchasing power (Eurofound, 2009). The agreement 
increased financial benefits for those in temporary unemployment and thus stabilized 
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purchasing power without increasing labour costs. Moreover, many sectoral agreements 
specified modest wage increases and a redundancy benefit in the metal sector was 
implemented in 2010 (Glassner et al., 2011). In Germany, various sector-level agreements 
specified that previously guaranteed wage increases could be suspended or delayed at the 
company-level during the crisis, leading to wage moderation. The focus of the 2010-metal-
sector agreement was generally to safeguard employment by making use of short-time work, 
flexibility practices and by waiving demands for higher wages (for more information, see 
Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 2010). Furthermore, a one-year employment guarantee for those in 
short-time work was implemented in the metal sector (Glassner et al., 2011).1 
Additionally, different legal measures were available to prevent mass-layoffs, which 
could be used at the company level. In Germany, short-time work (Kurzarbeit) can be 
implemented in a workplace in case of a substantial drop of production volume if 
management and works council agree.2 The weekly working-time can be reduced to up to 
zero hours for a limited period for certain employees or even the entire workforce. 
Therefore, short-time work should help prevent layoffs and offers the possibility to companies 
to keep workers with critical skills in times of crisis. Workers in short-time work earn the wage 
for the hours worked in the company, and the German Federal Employment Agency pays 
60%/67% (without/with children) of the difference between normal and actual wage level. 
                                                          
1 Various quantitative studies based on the IAB Establishment Panel shed light on company-level responses 
to the crisis in Germany (e.g. Bellmann and Gerner, 2012; Bellmann, Gerner and Upward, 2012). A comparable 
panel is not available for the Belgian case.  
2 Short-time work was included in several sectoral collective agreements (also in the metal sector). Further 
information can be found in Bispinck (2010).  
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The practice can normally be used for six months, but this timeframe was extended several 
times during the crisis to continue to safeguard employment. In 2008, companies could 
employ a short-time work policy for up to 12 months; this was extended in 2009 to 24 months, 
in 2010 it was shortened to 18 months and in 2011 limited once again to 12 months. If the 
company offered training to its staff in the meantime, then the Federal Employment Agency 
paid the workers’ entire social security contributions from the first month onwards. If not, 
the company had to pay half of these contributions in the first six months. However, short-
time work did not cover temporary agency workers according to §11 AÜG (law on temporary 
agency work) prior to the crisis, but it was temporarily implemented from February 2009 
until December 2010. Since then, the question of extending the scheme indefinitely to 
agency workers has been controversially discussed in Germany.  
In Belgium, statutory short-time work was introduced and could be applied after 
concluding company-level agreements independent of the sector. Moreover, temporary 
unemployment (tijdelijke werkloosheid/chômage économique) was reinforced at the company-level. If 
companies can prove to be in economic difficulty, they can partly or wholly suspend a 
worker’s employment contract for limited time. The affected workers are entitled to receive 
unemployment benefits borne by the National Employment Office (70%/75% of the last 
income without/with family). Before the crisis, temporary unemployment only applied to blue-
collar workers, but the system was extended to white-collar employees in 2012. Under the 
new system white-collar staff could be temporarily unemployed for up to 26 weeks with the 
right to receive unemployment benefits. Furthermore, other measures such as the system of 
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time-credit (tijdskrediet/credit-temps) 3  allowing time off for career breaks (e.g. for further 
education or family-life) were used since working-time for white- and blue-collar employees 
could be shortened, enabling firms to keep its staff employed (Vandaele, 2009; Eurofound, 
2009). Unions and employers agreed to extend temporary unemployment as early as 2008 to 
workers on fixed-term and agency work contracts.  
Overall, the state played a crucial role in both Germany and Belgium by taking on at 
least part of the cost incurred by companies during the crisis on to itself. Making policies 
like short-time work available allowed for labour hoarding, which reflects the interests of 
the state, companies and unions alike. Yet, the question remains whether different 
contractual groups of workers could equally profit from these policies or not.  
 
Selected characteristics of collective bargaining and workplace-level industrial 
relations in Germany and Belgium 
Germany and Belgium both feature multi-employer collective bargaining systems, which are 
based on clear procedural rules linking sector and company levels (Marginson and Galetto, 
2014). Respective collective agreements may be used as resources granting bargaining power 
to unions in workplace-level negotiations (Pulignano et al., forthcoming). The link between 
sector- and company-level is achieved through delegation in both countries (Marginson and 
                                                          
3 In the Belgian private sector, time-credit enables workers to take a career break and to receive unemployment 
benefits during this period. Employees can either wholly suspend their employment contract, or reduce their 
working hours from full- to part-time. More information is available here: 
http://www.werk.belgie.be/defaultTab.aspx?id=550 
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Galetto, 2014), which means that sector-level agreements determine a wide range of issues. 
In Belgium, the delegation principle provides a set of rules to be followed in local 
negotiations, restricting the possibility to deviate from (multi-) sector agreements. Opening 
clauses enabling firms to go below standards set at the sector level hardly appear in sectoral 
collective agreements; and if they exist, they are only rarely used at the workplace level 
(Keune, 2011). In contrast, in Germany, company-level agreements can deviate from sector-
agreements, especially via opening clauses (tarifliche Öffnungsklausel).4 For this reason, it was 
by far more difficult to counteract the pressure for collective bargaining decentralisation and 
moderation of wages and working conditions from the side of the employers (Glassner and 
Keune, 2012) than in Belgium. This results in greater leeway for companies in Germany than 
in Belgium.  
At the workplace level, union-dominated works councils are strongly tied to sectoral 
collective agreements in Belgium. They need to control and ensure that provisions of the 
sectoral agreement are reflected in policies and practices in the workplace and can expand 
workplace-level regulation within the sectoral framework (Pulignano, 2012). They also have 
information (and some consultation) rights to be actively involved in shaping workplace-
                                                          
4 Please note that workplace-level deviations from sectoral agreements in metalworking are also possible based 
on the so-called ‘Pforzheim Agreement’ (2004). Under specific circumstances, companies in trouble can 
temporarily deviate from the provisions of the sectoral collective agreement in terms of pay if they commit 
themselves to safeguard employment. This is only possible with the consent of, and after review by, the 
signatories of the sectoral agreement. Urban (2012) argues that the Pforzheim Agreement has provided more 
scope for IG Metall to be involved in the required review process for derogations from the sectoral agreement. 
Hence, although there is scope for higher flexibility, it is subject to some union control. Further information 
can be found here: http://www.igmetall.de/view_tarifglossar-pforzheim-vereinbarung-10870.htm 
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level regulation 5 . In Germany, works councils assure that workplace-level regulation 
complies with the law and with sectoral collective agreements. Furthermore, works councils 
have involvement and co-determination rights especially in terms of working hours, wage 
structures, rules of operation, workplace layout, vocational training and staffing 
requirements (they also approve new appointments and can formally object dismissals of 
regular workers) (Page, 2011).  
Differences between Germany and Belgium exist regarding temporary employment 
and union responses towards it. The regulation of fixed-term work is relatively similar in 
both countries, since such contracts can be legally entered into with or without a specific 
cause. In the former case, contracts can be renewed if the specific reason still applies whereas 
in the latter, they can only be renewed up to three times (maximum duration of 24 months). 
Regarding agency work, there are differences between Belgium and Germany. Firstly, the 
equality principle regarding pay and working conditions only really applies in Belgium (see 
Doerflinger and Pulignano, 2015). Secondly, the fact that regular and agency workers in the 
user firm are covered by different sector-level collective agreements in Germany may 
increase the gap between these workers.6 Unionists in Belgium have negotiated additional 
workplace-level agreements on temporary work for a long time (for instance specifying 
employment paths or enhancing training provision). In Germany, works councils have 
                                                          
5 For further information, see http://www.werk.belgie.be/defaulttab.aspx?id=525 
6 The sectoral agreement for work agencies in Germany, signed by the German Trade Union Confederation 
DGB, sets lower pay rates compared to the metal sector agreement covering the four company cases as user 
firms.  
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struggled to include aspects on agency work in workplace-level agreements because those 
workers formally belong to a work agency and should therefore be represented by the 
agency’s works council. However, the persistent gap in working conditions and wages 
between regular and agency workers has put pressure on user firm works councils to 
counteract. This might be difficult in practice, since works councillors lack co-determination 
rights in this respect (they are informed before agency workers are used and can in principle 
object if their use is not only ‘temporary’ according to § 99 BetrVG). In 2012, the works 
councillors’ rights to intervene were strengthened, since the 2012-metal sector collective 
agreement encourages and empowers them to negotiate voluntary workplace-level 
agreements on agency work (other industries like the chemical sector followed and 
implemented similar provisions in their agreements). 
 
Research design and methodology 
This article is based on in-depth comparative case studies of four subsidiaries of two 
multinational companies operating in the metal sector in Belgium and Germany. Both 
companies were hit hard by the crisis (see Table 1) and employed crisis-related collective 
bargaining strategies. We retrospectively look at the period when the crisis hit the plants 
until their economic recovery. In so doing, the article explicitly examines crisis-related 
collective bargaining and its short-term effects on workers under varying contracts. The 
comparison of two companies in two different countries is useful for investigating whether 
the crisis produced similar or different effects in workplaces within and/or across countries. 
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Furthermore, it allows the assessment of if and to what extent a country’s institutional 
framework could influence effects of a crisis. The comparison between Germany and 
Belgium works particularly well due to the fact that both countries feature different union 
traditions and systems of worker representation despite their generally coordinated nature. 
The results of this specific case study are not meant to generalize across the board, but are 
only to draw conclusions related to the particular workplaces we investigated.   
Firm1 is a US-American conglomerate operating in the broad manufacturing sector. 
It uses basic technology to supply standardized components, mainly to the automotive 
industry and employs about 130,000 staff (mainly low- to medium-skilled blue-collar 
workers). Although Firm1 has a leading position in many of its markets, it faces competition 
from all over the world. Hence, both flexibility and cost-competitiveness were crucial issues 
on Firm1’s bargaining agenda over the past decade. Consequently, the use of different 
contractual arrangements has become more pronounced. In particular, temporary agency 
and fixed-term work are used in this way. The German plant mostly uses it agency workforce 
for relatively simple tasks in production where agency and permanent workers work side-
by-side. In the Belgian plant, fixed-term workers also mostly work in production together 
with the permanent workforce. Firm1 was hit particularly hard by the crisis from 2009 on. 
By that time, pre-crisis orders were finished and there was a lack of new orders, which led 
to a 50% decline in work volume in Europe, on average. The crisis mainly impacted on the 
company’s European and Northern American operations, while developing markets such as 
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Brazil and China were barely affected. As a whole, Firm1 was still profitable during the crisis, 
but those profits were unevenly distributed.  
Firm2 is a European multinational in the field of power generation and transport 
with about 92,000 employees, half of them being blue-collars and most of them being highly 
skilled. The investigated plants operate in the transport division and develop and 
manufacture high-tech, customized products (components for building and assembling 
trains). Therefore, the products and working conditions differ across sites, but the skill 
profile of the workforce is similar. Although many of its orders come from the public sector, 
Firm2 has had to strengthen its competitiveness in the past years. Specifically, an increase of 
the firm’s internal adaptability while reducing labour costs was achieved through more 
flexible contracts. Firm2 primarily uses temporary agency workers and external contractors. 
While agency workers execute relatively simple production-related tasks, external 
contractors are mostly highly-skilled engineers who are actively involved in product 
development. Firm2 was affected most by the crisis from 2010 on. The company recorded 
a drop in order intake at an average of nearly 40 in its core markets Europe and North 
America. Although the company’s operations in emerging markets still yielded profits, 
substantial restructuring was carried out in Firm2’s European and North American 
operations.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
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The data collection was carried out between autumn 2011 and autumn 2012, and some 
follow-up interviews were conducted in summer 2013. Firm1 and Firm2 were chosen for 
analysis due to some crucial similarities and differences. Specifically, both companies feature 
different workforce skill levels related to the technology (low and high) used by the firm. 
This allows assessing the extent to which these firm-level differences are reflected in the 
outcomes of crisis-related collective bargaining. Nonetheless, both companies operate in the 
metal sector and the four plants feature high levels of unionization. Moreover, they both use 
about 20% flexible labour, which enables comparisons of workers under different contracts. 
In Firm1, the permanent and temporary staff worked side-by-side, executing the similar or 
even the same tasks while in Firm2 the two groups of staff were rather segmented. Generally, 
looking at different production sites within the same firm across countries makes for a good 
comparison, as the general company policy should be the same. 
The data analysis is based on 25 semi-structured interviews in Firm1 and Firm2. 
Interviews were carried out with strategic and operational HR managers to comprehend 
workplace-level policies and practices and the way they were negotiated. We also interviewed 
works councillors and trade unionists in order to get information about their positions and 
viewpoints regarding local negotiations and agreements. In addition, we talked to unionists 
at the sector-level to get a view on general industry developments and with European HR 
managers of both companies to explore the general HR policy. The interviews were 
conducted in the respondents’ native languages (German, Dutch and French) and took 
between one and two hours. All interviews were recorded, transcribed and translated. We 
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also collected documentary materials such as company-level agreements, annual reports or 
relevant newspaper articles to complement the gathered primary data. To systematically 
analyse the data, we made use of NVivo.  
 
Crisis-related collective bargaining and its effects on different groups of workers 
The case of Firm1 
Since Firm1’s German plant had already faced economic difficulty in 2004, several 
workplace-level flexibility practices had been implemented (especially relating to working-
time flexibility) which helped to cope with the initial crisis phase in 2010. A working-time 
corridor (28 hours to 42 hours per week) had been in place, depending on production 
volume. This was possible because of an opening clause in the metal sector agreement, 
which enabled deviations from the 35 hour-week. Furthermore, a 20% agency work-quota 
had been implemented to be able to react more flexibly to changing production volumes. 
Based on these measures, Firm1’s German plant was highly profitable but the lack of 
incoming orders drastically decreased the workload in late 2010. The workplace’s average 
production volume of around 1,000 components per year plummeted to around 250. As 
immediate reaction, management and works councillors agreed to reduce the weekly 
working-time for all blue-collar and about half of the white-collar staff to the minimum of 
28 hours. Three months later, new orders were still out of sight and therefore, management 
and works council negotiated workplace-level ‘adjustment mechanisms’ to counteract the 
incurring losses. Both parties agreed to implement short-time work (as encouraged by the state 
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and a specific sectoral collective agreement) for permanent workers in most production-
related and some administrative departments. Management and works council were in 
favour of the system, since it allowed keeping jobs and skills simultaneously. The affected 
permanent workforce, however, had to cope with income losses, since the unemployment 
insurance fund only provided partial compensation. Furthermore, management decided to 
let almost all agency workers leave7 and to not prolong fixed-term contracts because of the 
lack of work. The works council did not have to be involved since it lacked co-determination 
rights in this respect.  
 
“The situation in the crisis was indeed difficult. Apart from our ordinary employees, we had also 500 
temporary workers – agency and fixed-term – about 350 in production. Only few of them have remained 
since their skills are required here. The others were made redundant.” (Works councillor, Firm1 Germany)  
 
Temporary workers functioned as a safeguard for the core workforce’s jobs and provided 
an extra layer of protection. Only few agency workers providing critical skills remained in 
the plant’s workforce (employed via work agencies).  
Firm1’s Belgian plant was hit by the crisis in mid-2009, with a 70%-decline in 
production volume. Management wanted to immediately implement temporary unemployment 
                                                          
7 It is likely that these temporary agency workers were still employed by their work agency after having left 
Firm1 as their user firm, and thus not made redundant (this also applies to the other investigated workplaces). 
However, this article focuses on the plants of Firm1 and Firm2 as user firms, and this is why we did not follow 
up the agency workers’ further employment path.  
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as encouraged by the state for almost all permanently employed blue-collar workers (about 
50% of the entire workforce). However, the unions refused to give their necessary consent 
because temporarily suspending these workers’ employment contracts would have meant a 
loss of income.  
 
“We cannot accept that our company demands of the workers to make concessions with regard to their salary 
when they are doing okay overall – that’s impossible, that’s not conceivable.” (Unionist, Firm1 Belgium) 
 
The unions demanded paying an allowance to the concerned workers to not have any 
financial penalty because of temporary unemployment and asked for training allowances to use 
the ‘time-off’ to invest in the workforce’s skills. Management – in need of the union’s 
consent – was quick to agree. Consequently, the Belgian unemployment insurance paid most 
of the affected workers’ salaries, and Firm1 topped it up to keep initial wage levels as 
demanded by the unions. Additionally, trainings were offered which gave the permanent 
workforce the possibility to improve skills. Meanwhile, management intended not to 
prolong fixed-term contracts to react to the declining workload and upcoming cost pressure. 
However, a workplace-level agreement on ‘employment paths’ for temporary workers had 
been in place already, negotiated between management and the local unions prior to the 
crisis. Specifically, fixed-term contracts were the mode of entering the company, which 
would be upgraded to permanent contracts after one/three years (white-collar/blue-collar 
workers). The agreement could temporarily be suspended under specific circumstances such 
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as an economic crisis, but unions objected to the immediate suspension of the agreement, 
leading to a compromise under which the 40 employees who had met the qualifying period 
received a permanent contract and thus became part of the core workforce. The other fixed-
term workers had to leave when their contracts expired. 
 
“We lost 20% of our workers in the crisis. They were all on fixed-term contracts that were not extended. 
There was hope because Firm1brought people back, but this didn’t last and today there is a freeze of 
recruitment.” (Unionist, Firm1 Belgium) 
 
When the crisis continued, the initial workplace-level measures proved to be 
insufficient to cope with its scope and more extensive, longer-term solutions had to be 
found. In Germany, additional measures were negotiated in mid-2011, while short-time work 
was still in place. Management demanded concessions from the workforce to safeguard the 
plant, and the works council – being put under pressure, fearing the loss of jobs like in the 
2004-crisis and lacking the security offered by a strong sector-level agreement – felt it had 
to give in to secure employment. Workplace-level agreements were therefore concluded in 
three areas: Firstly, internal mobility was fostered by sending employees to other 
departments. For instance, production workers with computer skills were placed in 
administrative units. Likewise, management established cooperation with other firms in the 
region to send its staff there. This ‘leasing’ measure was encouraged by the sectoral 
metalworking agreement, however Firm1’s success was limited, since the whole region was 
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equally affected by the crisis. The higher internal mobility decreased the employees’ level of 
discretion on their job content, as they could be moved from one position to another based 
on the firm’s needs. Secondly, working-time patterns for production workers became more 
flexible. Particularly, the shift-system was directly linked to production volume and could 
thus change within days. This also meant that workers had to take over more weekend and 
night work in times of high workload, which decreased the employees’ level of control over 
their working-time. Finally, an early retirement scheme offered the possibility of leaving the 
company at the age of 55 at relatively favourable conditions, granting financial stability to 
those leaving. This gave incentive to the older core workers to leave, but only 5% of them 
did so. By agreeing to higher levels of flexibility and conceding on working conditions, the 
works council safeguarded the core workforce’s jobs.  
 In Belgium, problems were caused because temporary unemployment exclusively covered 
blue-collar workers. However, the white-collar employees’ workload dropped as well. 
Because of this, creative solutions had to be found. In late 2009, management and unions 
jointly decided to encourage white-collar workers to use the system of time-credit, which 
enables career breaks for every worker in the private sector by Belgian law and which the 
state recommended to use during the crisis. Employees taking time-credit could shift from 
full-time to part-time work or entirely suspend their employment contract for a while. At 
the same time, they were entitled to receiving unemployment benefits to partially 
compensate for the loss of salary. To encourage using this system, unions demanded paying 
an additional allowance to the affected workers to partly close the income gap. Management 
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agreed, since it needed the unions’ support to encourage white-collar staff to take time-credit. 
Many of them decided to do so, because they did not have too big financial cuts on their 
initial salaries. Additionally, a workplace-level agreement on strengthening internal mobility 
was negotiated, implying that employees could be temporarily moved to other departments 
if skills allowed for it. This was viewed as both on-the-job training and acted as a way of 
diversifying the workforce’s skills. Overall, the crisis measures adopted by Firm1’s Belgian 
plant were less drastic than in Germany, since unions successfully pushed for stabilizing the 
permanent workforce’s jobs and working conditions.  
 The aforementioned measures helped Firm1 to overcome the crisis. The German 
plant’s situation improved because of new orders in early 2013, which terminated short-time 
work. Being able to use the policy for 24 months – this timeframe was extended several times 
by the German state – helped to substantially limit the plant’s losses. Therefore, plant closure 
and forced redundancies were avoided.  
 
“Flexibility is certainly a crucial factor for the survival of the plant. 15-20% of agency work seems to be 
necessary for the well-being of the company and the permanent staff. Of course it is the agency workers who 
suffer from that situation. In the end I think that both the instruments of our government and the ones that 
we agreed on were crucial for securing the jobs of the plant.“ (Works councillor, Firm1 Germany) 
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 The Belgian plant recovered faster, since new orders came in about a year after the 
crisis hit it. This terminated temporary unemployment and caused an immediate lack of staff, so 
the company sought to rehire workers whose contracts expired before.  
 
“So in 2009, we stopped hundreds of temporary contracts, month after month, and in 2010, the business 
started very sharply again, so we had an upturn, and we needed staff. We managed to hire back less than 
300 people – 300 temporary contracts that we stopped before.” (HR Manager, Firm1 Belgium) 
 
The case of Firm2 
Firm2’s German plant was hit by the crisis in spring 2010, when several public orders were 
cancelled, leading to a forecasted long-term drop in production volume of about 40% for 
the coming three years. As initial reaction, management decided to dispense of half of the 
plant’s agency workers’ services, and the remaining half had to leave within the coming 
weeks. The agency workers were low- to medium-skilled, executing help functions in 
production and administration. From a management perspective, letting agency workers 
leave was an easy way to rapidly reduce costs. The works council could not formally oppose 
due to lacking co-determination rights on this aspect, but at the same time, this potentially 
assured the jobs of Firm2’s core workforce. 
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“With the crisis even most works councils were quite happy that only agency workers were made redundant. 
There is nothing worse for a works council than if the core workforce is being touched by management.” 
(Works councillor, Firm2 Germany) 
 
Firm2 Belgium entered the crisis in mid-2010 when several large-scale orders were 
cancelled, leading to a decreasing work volume of about 40%. Compared to the more 
production-oriented German plant, the Belgian workplace focused on R&D. This meant a 
smaller share of production activity (mostly prototyping) and a lower number of medium- 
to high-skilled blue-collar workers, hired via temporary work agencies. Like in Germany, 
management wanted to stop the contracts of its agency workforce, but there were individuals 
with critical skills among them. After an evaluation of the skills needed and being pushed by 
the unions to keep as many workers as possible and upgrade their contracts, management 
offered permanent contracts to ten highly-skilled agency workers. Unions were not in favour 
of letting the other agency workers leave, but could not formally object due to the absence 
of a corresponding workplace-level agreement.  
 
“When things got bad, the company told us ‘we have to dismiss people’. And the first ones to be dismissed 
are those on temporary contracts. Most temps haven’t got any career perspective at all here. This workforce is 
there when needed. If not needed, it’s over.” (Works councillor, Firm2 Belgium) 
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The initial measures adopted in both plants were not enough to cope with the 
ongoing crisis. In Germany, management decided to not prolong most fixed-term contracts 
in mid-2010; only a few of those workers were offered permanent contracts due to 
possessing skills that were scarce on the labour market. The works council was not involved 
because of the absence of co-determination rights in this respect, but ending the contracts 
of external contractors was not considered an option by management although these highly-
skilled engineers were expensive. Similar to agency workers, they were not directly hired by 
Firm2, and therefore, it would have been easy to stop their contracts without giving 
severance payments or other gratuities. Yet, their skills distinguished them from most of the 
agency workforce, which is why Firm2 kept them despite their price. Meanwhile, 
management and works councillors negotiated additional workplace-level crisis measures. 
Both parties agreed to reduce the hours in the staff’s working-time accounts as a 
precondition to introduce short-time work. Consequently, the core workforce had to give away 
the hours that they hoped to use for going on sabbatical or extending parental leave, and 
they had to cope with a loss of income due to short-time work. Management also demanded 
increased flexibility through internal mobility and the works council felt it had to consent to 
secure jobs during the crisis. For this reason, workers could be sent to other German plants 
of Firm2 and the neighbouring countries for short periods if their profiles fitted the needs. 
Although across-plant mobility was voluntary, employees feared to endanger their jobs if 
not agreeing to it. Higher levels of functional flexibility and mobility were demanded by all 
employees alike, reducing the staff’s control over job content and work location.  
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“We have no problems with flexibility at all as long as the jobs of the employees are secure. We know that 
companies have to be able to react to the developments on the markets.” (Works councillor, Firm2 Germany) 
 
Based on the aforementioned workplace-level agreements, forced redundancies were able 
to be prevented. However, in the spring of 2011, management demanded a headcount 
reduction to cut labour costs in the long-run because the order books for the coming years 
indicated lower product demand as orders were cancelled. Therefore, management and 
works councils negotiated generous voluntary separation and early retirement plans. Six 
months later, more than 300 workers accepted the offers. Since the plant was located in an 
economically strong region, the prospects of finding other work were good. Almost two 
years after the crisis hit the plant (in 2012), new orders came in and short-time work was 
terminated. Soon after, new agency workers were hired to deal with the increasing workload.  
In Belgium, further measures had to be implemented in late 2010 because the 
workload in R&D declined, too. Using temporary unemployment was no option, as it only 
applied to blue-collar workers by then. Similar to the German plant, management and unions 
decided to strengthen cross-border mobility, sending employees to other plants in the 
neighbouring countries on short assignments. This workplace-agreement was considered as 
an intercultural and on-the-job-training, enabling the workforce to develop further skills. 
However, it only applied to a very specific group of staff with good language skills. The 
unions also proposed using the system of time-credit in a creative manner as encouraged by 
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the Belgian state, but management objected and refused to grant extra financial incentives 
to encourage employees to use their time-credit. Taking it is an individual choice and 
companies cannot oblige employees to do so. In other words, management avoided the risk 
of having too few employees taking their time-credit. Instead, management demanded a 
headcount reduction to which the unions agreed in early 2011, based on the promise to do 
it voluntarily, to give generous severance payments and most importantly, to stabilize the 
working conditions of the workforce. This allowed workers to leave the plant under 
favourable conditions, sparing the remaining workforce from changing working conditions. 
Furthermore, the classroom training budget for the small lower-skilled group of workers 
was cut and more emphasis put on on-the-job training. The effects of this decision on the 
permanent workforce were limited, since tasks involving lower-skilled personnel were 
mostly fulfilled by agency workers. This group, however, had to accept that future training 
was mostly executed on-the-job instead of in the classroom. Finally, a few external 
contractors had to leave the company but like in Germany, the majority of them was kept 
since their skills were indispensable. This package of local agreements brought the Belgian 
plant through the crisis. When new orders came in 2012, the situation markedly improved 
and 100 agency workers were hired for the production department.  
 
“It has become common to have a ‘security buffer’. As work decreases, we will simply reduce our ‘extra’ 
temporary staff. Of course, when the company fires someone, it doesn’t want to give severance payments, etc. 
It’s easy to fire a temp.” (Works councillor, Firm2 Belgium) 
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Why were different groups of workers not treated equally? 
Considering the German and Belgian cases of Firm1 and Firm2, differences in the short-term 
effects of crisis-related collective bargaining on the temporary and permanent workforces 
are evident (see Table 2). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Temporary workers – who were already vulnerable before the crisis – were the most heavily 
affected. The workplace agreements in reached by Firm1 and Firm2 mainly strove towards 
securing permanent workforces that were at risk, and the layer of flexible temporary staff 
around them contributed to achieving this objective. Cross-country differences were able to 
be  observed, as the Belgian unionists succeeded in keeping some temporary workers, who 
received permanent contracts and entered the core workforce whereas in Germany, works 
councils could hardly safeguard temporary workers due to lacking co-determination rights. 
Furthermore, while jobs and working conditions could be kept for the permanent Belgian 
workforces, their German counterparts had to concede on working conditions to safeguard 
employment. Comparing the two companies reveals differences in the nature of crisis-
related collective bargaining: Firm1 (medium- to low-skilled workforce) was characterised by 
concession-oriented workplace-level bargaining while Firm2 (highly-skilled workforce) by 
consensus-driven bargaining patterns. We explain the short-term effects of crisis-related 
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collective bargaining on different contractual groups across countries and companies by the 
interaction of institutional factors and firm-level contexts.  
Belgium’s bargaining system is characterised by delegation as articulation mechanism 
between sector- and company-level, while the German system also allows for derogation 
(Marginson and Galetto, 2014). Company-level deviations are therefore possible in 
Germany if the sector-level agreement allows for it and if works councillors and 
management locally consent to a more workplace-specific agreement. This high degree of 
discretion for workplace-level actors could be used by management to push for concessions 
on working conditions to safeguard employment. Works councils could not make use of the 
procedural security offered by strong and binding sector-level agreements to oppose such 
management requests and thus had to give in. The works councillors also lacked ‘local’ 
institutional resources linked to co-determination rights. Co-determination should have 
been able to ensure the active involvement of works councillors in company-level politics, 
but those rights were missing altogether  in regard to letting temporary workers leave, 
making it impossible for works councillors to formally object such decisions. As a result, 
works councils were put in a defensive position, being unable to keep temporary workers 
and stabilize the permanent workforce’s working conditions. In contrast to Firm1 where all 
temporary workers had to leave, a few fixed-term workers and nearly all external contractors 
were kept in Firm2’s German plant because they possessed indispensable skills. This did not 
apply for agency workers in Firm2’s production-oriented German plant, where they filled 
low skilled roles. During the crisis, those functions – if needed – were carried out by the 
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permanent workforce to keep them busy. Overall, company-level deviations from sectoral 
agreements need to be considered in the context of ‘disorganized’ bargaining 
decentralization in Germany (Traxler et al., 2001), which has shifted power from the sector- 
to the firm-level.8 In light of crisis-related collective bargaining in Firm1 and Firm2, the 
power shift weakened works councils as already pointed out in earlier studies (e.g. Holst, 
2014; Hassel, 2014). Hence, a trade-off between keeping jobs and concessions on working 
conditions evolved as short-term outcome for the German permanent workforces implying 
that the job stability of the core and the instability of the temporary workers were 
complementary, increasing the gap between those groups of staff (Hassel, 2014).  
Although Belgium has seen some organized decentralization, this has hardly 
impacted on the importance of sector-level agreements (Pulignano, 2012). Since deviations 
from those agreements were hardly possible, local actors have no leeway to undermine 
standards set at higher levels. Therefore, Belgian company-level actors were limited in the 
practices they could adopt, while their German counterparts had far more discretion 
(Pulignano et al., forthcoming). For this reason, the Belgian unionists benefited from strong 
sector-level agreements with limited derogation capacity, which helped to stabilize the 
regular workforces’ jobs and working conditions during the crisis. Specifically, in Firm1, an 
earlier negotiated agreement on ‘employments paths’ proved to be a resource for unions to 
                                                          
8 Among others, Nienhüser and Hoßfeld (2008) use the term Verbetrieblichung to refer to this development and 
to stress the importance of workplace-level collective bargaining in Germany.  
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keep some temporary workers. They also utilized their consent to implement temporary 
unemployment to promote stable working conditions for the permanent workforce. Therefore, 
negotiations in Firm1’s Belgian plant were concession-driven. A more consensus-driven 
bargaining pattern was observed in Firm2. In contrast to the production-oriented German 
subsidiary, the Belgian plant focused on product development and employed less manual 
workers, which were hired via agencies. Since they mainly did prototyping, the demanded 
skill-level was higher and thus, there was an interest to keep some of them during the crisis. 
The skilled agency workers were eligible to receive a permanent contract in the Belgian plant 
for this reason. Similarly, most external contractors were kept due to their needed skills. 
Consensus also prevailed in regard to the practices negotiated for the core workforce in the 
course of the crisis. None of the adopted measures by Firm2 were the outcome of 
concessions, but rather the result of management and employee representatives 
compromising to find consensus. An encompassing collective bargaining system which 
allows for hardly any company- or workplace-level deviations could be used by trade unions 
as a means to keep some temporary workers and to stabilize the core workforces’ jobs and 
working conditions during the crisis. It remains to be seen if the negotiated compromises in 
the Belgian and German workplaces persist long term.  
Overall, the institutional system defined the framework under which crisis-related 
collective bargaining took place, however local actors were not without a voice in shaping 
its outcomes. The main difference between Firm1 and Firm2 is the skill level of the 
workforce. The specific skills which were scarce on the labour market could be used as a 
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resource by unionists in Firm2 that helped employee representatives keep some temporary 
workers in both countries. In Firm1 where the skill-level was medium-low, unions had to 
make use of local institutional resources where they existed (Belgium) to enforce some 
protection for the workers via concessions. Overall, the replaceability of skills in Firm1 in 
contrast to the scarcity of skills in Firm2 mediated the short-term effects of crisis-related 
collective bargaining and helps explain the different bargaining patterns across companies.  
 
Conclusion 
The main objective of this study was to investigate the short-term effects of crisis-related 
collective bargaining on different contractual groups of workers in four workplaces in 
Germany and Belgium. The study sheds light on some of the nuances across countries, 
companies and workplaces, as well as different effects on permanent and temporary 
workers. When the crisis hit the four plants, the initial reaction was to let temporary workers 
go. While the German works councillors lacked co-determination rights to inhibit this step, 
their Belgian counterparts were successful in keeping some temporary workers whose 
contracts were upgraded to permanent ones. When the crisis endured, differences regarding 
the treatment of the core workforces across countries could be observed. The Belgian 
unions were able to stabilize both jobs and working conditions of the permanent 
workforces, while the German works councils conceded on working conditions to safeguard 
those workers’ jobs. We explain the observed diversity in the short-term effects of crisis-
related collective bargaining with the interaction of institutional and firm-level factors. The 
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Belgian encompassing bargaining system hardly allowed for company-level deviations, 
creating a favourable environment to stabilize jobs and working conditions alike. In this 
context, Firm1’s unionists engaged in concession bargaining to keep some temporary 
workers based on a previously negotiated workplace agreement. As the crisis persisted, they 
were able to stabilize the core’s jobs and working conditions in exchange for their consent 
to use temporary unemployment. In Firm2, skilled temporary workers and highly-qualified 
external contractors were kept in times of crisis. Unions and management were successful 
in reaching local consensus on several measures for the permanent workforce without 
engaging in concession bargaining. Skills arguably influenced crisis-related collective 
bargaining patterns, leading to a more consensus-oriented pattern in Firm2. In contrast, 
Germany has witnessed a power shift from the sector- to the company-/workplace-level, 
resulting in a weakening of works councils. For both workplaces, this meant letting nearly 
all temporary workers leave and endorsing concessions on the permanent workforce’s 
working conditions to save their jobs. Contrary to Firm1, the high skill level in Firm2 
mediated the effects of crisis-related collective bargaining because a few skilled fixed-term 
workers and nearly all external contractors were kept, and negotiations were in general more 
consensus-driven. Overall, we observe that where skills were high (Firm2), it was easier to 
keep temporary workers and negotiate guarantees for the core workforce since management 
did not want to risk losing skilled workers. However, the observed outcomes in Firm1 and 
Firm2 still differed across national borders due to more (Belgium) or less (Germany) 
favourable institutional contexts. As shown, nuances existed across and within countries and 
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companies, emphasising that outcomes are contingent upon the local and national 
(institutional) context, and in particular upon their interaction. These cases illustrate that 
despite the difficulty trade unions may face when trying to protect the interests of potentially 
vulnerable groups of workers, institutional power resources could help to overcome such 
difficulty. However, this article is only considering the short-term effects of crisis-related 
collective bargaining on different groups of workers. It is too early to assess if the more 
favourable results in the Belgian context persist, or if the lower levels of discretion at the 
workplace-level may for instance be an incentive for location decisions. In other words, the 
favourable results in the short-run might have repercussions, putting pressure on the plants 
in the long-run because of the lower levels of flexibility compared to the German 
workplaces.  
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Table 1: Plant characteristics (as of spring 2012 for Firm1 and autumn 2012 for Firm2)9 
 Firm1 Germany Firm1  Belgium Firm2  Germany Firm2  Belgium 
Country of 
origin 
United States of America Europe 
Total workforce 130,000 92,000 
Technology Low technology High technology 
Skill profile Mainly low- to medium-skilled Mostly highly-skilled  
Workforce  1,700 2,500 2,600 1,000 
Blue-
collar/White-
collar workers 
850 / 850 1400 / 1100 1300 / 1300 150 / 850 
Trade unions  IG Metall ACV-CSC, 
ACLVB-CGSLB, 
ABVV-FGTB 
IG Metall ACV-CSC, 
ACLVB-CGSLB, 
ABVV-FGTB 
Union 
membership in 
the workplace 
80% 95% 75% 95% 
Works council Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employment 
contracts in the 
plant  
75% permanent 
workers, 20% 
agency workers, 
5% fixed-term 
workers 
80% permanent 
workers, 20% 
fixed-term 
workers 
80% permanent 
workers, 10% 
agency workers, 
5% fixed-term 
workers, about 5% 
external 
contractors 
80% permanent 
workers, 10% 
agency workers, 
10% external 
consultants 
Workplace-level 
collective 
agreements on 
employment 
contracts 
20%-quota on 
temporary agency 
work 
20%-quota on 
fixed-term work 
10% fixed-term 
and 10% agency 
workers – in some 
departments 
extendable to 30% 
20%-flexibility 
quota (fixed-term 
and agency 
workers) 
Crisis period Late 2010 until 
early 2013 
Mid-2009 until 
mid-2010 
Spring 2010 until 
2012 
Mid-2010 until 
2012 
 
  
                                                          
9 Those data are based on information given by the interviewees (mostly the general HR manager) in the four 
workplaces. Regarding the figures on blue-/white-collar staff, the respondents gave rounded estimates to get 
a general idea of the division of the workforces in the four plants.  
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Table 2: Effects of crisis-related collective bargaining on different groups of workers 
 Firm1 Germany Firm1 Belgium Firm2 Germany Firm2 Belgium 
Core 
workforce 
Jobs protected; 
concessions on 
working-time 
flexibility and 
internal mobility; 
voluntary early 
retirement schemes  
Jobs protected; 
working conditions 
remained almost 
untouched 
Jobs protected; but 
higher levels of 
internal mobility;  
voluntary 
separation and early 
retirement schemes  
Jobs protected; 
working conditions 
remained almost 
untouched 
Fixed-term 
workers 
Contracts were not 
prolonged or 
upgraded when the 
crisis hit the plant 
The majority of 
contracts was not 
prolonged, but 40 
workers were 
offered permanent 
contracts 
Apart from few 
exceptions (skills), 
contracts were not 
prolonged or 
upgraded when the 
crisis hit the plant 
Not applicable 
Temporary 
agency 
workers 
Had to immediately 
leave the plant 
when the 
production volume 
dropped 
Not applicable Had to leave the 
company within the 
first months after 
the crisis hit the 
plant 
Those possessing 
critical skills were 
offered permanent 
contracts, the others 
had to leave  
External 
contractors 
Not applicable Not applicable Since this group of 
workers provided 
critical skills to the 
plant, most of them 
were kept  
Only a few had to 
leave; the majority 
was kept because of 
their indispensable 
skills 
 
